


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17 May 1951

*DCI NOTED.  
5/21. NO FURTHER  
ACTION NECESSARY.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Survey of Interdepartmental Committees

1. The attached paper is submitted in response to your inquiry regarding this Agency's interdepartmental committee membership.
2. One of the committees involving O/SO is not listed for security reasons.
3. A copy of the attached paper and the lists of committees has been distributed to each Assistant Director for his information.



JAMES Q. RIEBIE  
Acting Assistant Director,  
Intelligence Coordination

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Attachment

MORI/CDF Pages 2 thru 7

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17 MAY 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

FROM: Acting Assistant Director, Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Survey of Interdepartmental Committees

1. In making a survey of Interdepartmental Committees in which CIA has an interest we have attempted to isolate the questions in which you are primarily interested. These may be:

a. Question: Do we know what committees there are?

Answer: Yes. Attached hereto are three lists:

(1) A list of interdepartmental committees in which CIA has a primary concern, either from the intelligence or the operations standpoint, and which have been established by the NSC, IAC, or CIA.

(2) A list of committees in which CIA participates but does not have the primary interest and which were established by agencies other than the IAC or CIA.

(3) A list of those committees which, though frequently referred to, have been found upon investigation to have been terminated or are in the process of termination.

b. Question: Are policy commitments being made in these interdepartmental committees and if so do the members have in each case authority to make the commitment?

Answer: It is not believed, from our survey, that CIA members of committees are making commitments for the Agency without proper authority. There are frequently occasions in which a CIA member undertakes to perform a task in the mutual interest of the Committee members which is at the same time in line with the functional responsibility of this Agency (and more specifically of his office). Many of these occur at the working level and, in fact, should be carried out on the responsibility of the Assistant Director concerned without reference to higher authority.

c. Question: Do other departments or agencies control CIA functions and decisions through the Committee device?

Answer: This is not believed to be the case. Other departments cannot control the kind of work CIA does if our people understand the Agency's functional responsibilities. It is believed

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that the officers concerned with interdepartmental committees are relatively clear on this matter and appreciate the need for top-level decision in this area. Furthermore the committees cannot assign workloads even in pursuance of proper responsibilities without the acquiescence of the assignees.

d. Question: Are the interdepartmental committees trying jointly to discharge responsibilities which clearly belong within a single agency?

Answer: In general this is not true, although the establishment of a committee is sometimes sought by an administrator simply to share his problem. The justification for a committee is rather that it can provide a systematic method of consultation and a means of dealing with problems where effective action must be coordinated in timing and emphasis. Clearly the existence of a committee cannot relieve the responsible official of any of his obligations. In general these principles are understood.

e. Question: Does adequate coordination require these committees?

Answer: Yes, in general. In most instances the formal committee is the most effective way of carrying out the required coordination. There are some cases in which coordination might be as effectively achieved through other means. Here the continuance of a committee rests upon a variety of factors. In those instances where it is clear that committees are the less effective means of coordination, this Office, in conjunction with the other Assistant Directors, is seeking their elimination. It is noteworthy that committees which are embedded in statute or directive are particularly hard to get rid of once they have outlived their usefulness.

f. Question: Are the interdepartmental committees in fact performing effectively and how can they be improved?


Answer: It is doubtful that any committee functions as effectively and as efficiently as we would like. A summary statement that we are doing well or badly is not very helpful. What is required is an examination and thereafter continuing alertness regarding the effectiveness of each committee and what steps can be taken for improvement. Initially each Assistant Director has the responsibility for being concerned and taking proper measures where necessary to see that committees under his own responsibility are effective. In addition it is my task to assist the Assistant Directors and yourself in seeking improvement. Suggestions for improvement may take different forms. Thus, for example, in the

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case of the Watch Committee O/IC in consultation with O/CI has submitted recommendations to you on what needs to be done and how we should proceed. In other cases suggestions have been made in the course of working with the Agency's committee chairmen or our representatives.

2. It is entirely to be expected that an agency such as CIA which has a sizeable coordinating role should use the formal committee as a technique or method in achieving coordination. Each administrator must realize, however, that he remains responsible for matters in his area whether there is a committee involved or not. The Director's problem, then, with respect to committees, becomes indistinguishable from the general problem of supervising the work of the major units of the Agency.



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JAMES Q. REBER

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INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES

LIST I

The following interdepartmental committees in which CIA has a primary concern, either from the intelligence or the operations standpoint, have been established by the NSC, IAC, or CIA:

- (1) The Intelligence Advisory Committee (DCI, O/NE, O/IC)
- (2) The U. S. Communications Intelligence Board (O/CI)  
Subcommittees: Security Committee  
Intelligence Committee  
Collateral Committee
- (3) The Watch Committee (O/CI)
- (4) Scientific Intelligence Committee (O/SI)  
Subcommittees: Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
Joint Biological Warfare Intelligence Committee  
Joint Chemical Warfare Intelligence Committee  
Joint Electronics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee  
Joint Medical Sciences Intelligence Committee  
Joint Aircraft Intelligence Committee  
Joint Anti-aircraft Intelligence Committee
- (5) National Intelligence Survey Committee and Subcommittees for individual chapters (O/RR)
- (6) \_\_\_\_\_)
- (7) Interdepartmental Committee for Implementation and Coordination of NSCID No. 7 (O/O)
- (8) O/PC Consultants (O/PC)
- (9) Informal Interagency Map Procurement Coordination Committee (O/RR)
- (10) Interdepartmental Study of the Soviet Bloc's Dollar Transactions and Holdings (O/RR)
- (11) Ad Hoc Committee on Soviet Logistical Capabilities (O/RR)

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LIST II

The following committees in which CIA participates but does not have the primary interest were established by agencies other than the IAC or CIA.

Category A: Committees in which CIA's role is mainly one of substantive intelligence support:

- (1) NSC Staff (O/NE)
- (2) U. S. Board on Geographic Names (O/RR)
- (3) Export Control Committee and its subcommittees (O/RR)
- (4) Special Committee on East-West Trade (O/RR)
- (5) Interdepartmental Chemical Statistics Committee (O/RR)
- (6) Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (O/SI)
- (7) Committees established by the Research and Development Board (O/SI)

Category B: Committees in which CIA's role, while conforming to no one pattern, is mainly other than providing substantive intelligence support:

- (1) AFSA Priorities Committee (O/CI)
- \* (2) Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization (O/FC)
- (3) Signal Corps Technical Committee (O/SO)
- (4) Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee (O/SO)
- (5) Federal Personnel Council (Adm)
- (6) Statistical Security Committee (Adm)
- (7) Policy Committee on Printing (Adm)
- (8) Emergency Planning (Adm)
- (9) State-Defense Military Information Control Committee (I&S)
- \*\* (10) Review Committee on Visual and Audio Material (O/CD)
- \*\* (11) Interdepartmental Committee to Effect the Voluntary Control of Unclassified Technological Information (O/CD)
- \*\*\* (12) Committee on Training Area Specialists (Training)

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\* Undergoing reorganization  
 \*\* CIA has observer status  
 \*\*\* Not yet organized

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**SECRET**LIST IIILIST OF COMMITTEES TERMINATED OR IN THE PROCESS OF TERMINATION

- (1) Working Committee on Transliterations (Far Eastern and Near Eastern Languages) (O/O)
- (2) Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Documents Exploitation (O/O)
- (3) Working Committee on Orthography of European Languages (L/O)
- (4) Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee for International Communism (O/RR)
- (5) Ad Hoc Committee on NSC 86 (DD/P)
- (6) Plans Division, NSRB (O/NE)
- \* (7) Joint Soviet Materials Intelligence Committee (SOWMAT) (O/O)
- \* (8) Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff
- \*\* (9) Interbureau Technical Committee at White Oak, Silver Spring (O/SI)
- \*\* (10) Special Committee on Foreign Sources of Strategic Supplies (O/RE)
- \*\*\* (11) Military Liaison Committee for AEC (O/CD)
- \*\*\*\* (12) Psychological Intelligence Committee (O/IC)

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- \* In process of termination
  - \*\* CIA association has been terminated though the committee still exists
  - \*\*\* As far as can be determined, CIA was never associated with this committee, which still exists
  - \*\*\*\* Dormant; status under review

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